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Essentialism, Externalism and Human Nature 
 
M.J. Cain 
 
1. Introduction 
Psychological essentialism is a prominent view within contemporary developmental 
psychology and cognitive science according to which children have an innate 
commitment to essentialism. If this view is correct then a commitment to essentialism 
is an important aspect of human nature rather than a culturally specific commitment 
peculiar to those who have received a specific philosophical or scientific education.1 
In this article my concern is to explore the philosophical significance of psychological 
essentialism with respect to the relationship between the content of our concepts and 
thoughts and the nature of the extra-cranial world. I will argue that, despite first 
appearances, psychological essentialism undermines a form of externalism that has 
become commonplace in the philosophy of mind and language.  
 
2. Psychological Essentialism  
As its name suggests, psychological essentialism is related to the traditional 
philosophical doctrine of essentialism.2 One can draw a rough distinction between 
two versions of essentialism. According to the first, many of the individual things that 
1 This latter view of essentialism is endorsed by Jerry Fodor, Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went 
Wrong (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
2 Historical advocates of essentialism include Aristotle and Locke. Perhaps the most prominent recent 
champions of essentialism are  Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980) and Putnam, 
‘The meaning of “meaning”’, in his Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers Volume 2 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). 
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populate the world have essences, where an essence is a property (or collection of 
properties) that is central to the identity of that thing so that it couldn’t lose the 
property without ceasing to exist. For example, it might be claimed that it is part of 
my essence that I am human but not part of my essence that I am an academic 
philosopher. Call this essentialism with respect to individuals. According to the 
second version of essentialism, it is categories of things that have essences. For 
example, in order to belong to the category HUMAN it is essential to be a mammal. 
This leaves it open as to whether any individual human is essentially human or as to 
whether any particular thing has an essence as such (as opposed to an essence relative 
to a particular category to which they belong).  Call this doctrine essentialism with 
respect to categories.3  
Psychological essentialism is a view within developmental psychology – and 
cognitive science more widely – that has come to prominence over the last two 
decades. In its boldest form it is the view that children are innately essentialist with 
respect to many of the categories for which they have concepts. For example, in virtue 
of an innate commitment to essentialism, a child who has acquired the concept DOG 
thinks of dogs as being bound together by a hidden essence so that any dog is a dog in 
virtue of possessing the relevant essence. Put this way, the implication would appear 
to be that children are, first and foremost, essentialists about categories as opposed to 
individuals.4 Essences are conceived of as being hidden and causally responsible for 
the observable properties of things. Due to this causal connection categorising things 
3 See Ellis, The Philosophy of Nature: A Guide to the New Essentialism, (Cheshum: Acumen, 2002) 
and Mackie, How Things Might Have Been, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006)  for a more 
detailed account of this distinction. 
4 Gelman, The Essential Child. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) is clear on this point. 
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on the basis of their observable properties will generally result in their being assigned 
to categories to which they belong. However, such a procedure falls short of being 
foolproof as, for example, something could appear to be a dog without being a dog 
and something could appear not to be a dog whilst being a dog. Typically, 
psychological essentialists regard children as holding a placeholder conception of 
essence; that is, children do not usually have any substantial views as to the precise 
nature of the essences of the categories that they adopt an essentialist attitude 
towards.5 With respect to the breadth of  childhood essentialism there is considerable 
disagreement. Keil6 argues that childhood essentialism is restricted to the biological 
domain. Gelman7 thinks that children are essentialist about a wider domain of reality 
that includes the psychological and  substances such as water but does not include 
artefacts. And Bloom8 holds that children are even essentialist with respect to 
artefacts such as coffee pots and works of art. What is important to appreciate is that 
as the psychological essentialist is making a claim about the metaphysical 
commitments of children she is not thereby committing herself to the truth of  
essentialism qua metaphysical doctrine. 
5 D. Medin and A. Ortony,  ‘Psychological essentialism’. In S. Vosniadou (ed.) Similarity and 
Analogical Reasoning, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).  
6 F. Keil,  Concepts, Kinds, and Cognitive Development. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989). 
7 Gelman, The Essential Child, op. cit.. 
8 P. Bloom,  How Children Learn the Meaning of Words (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000); P. 
Bloom,  Descartes’ Baby: How the Science of Child Development Explains What Makes us Human 
(New York: Basic Books, 2004); and  P. Bloom, How Pleasure Works: The New Science of Why we 
Like what we Like  (London: Bodley Head, 2010).  
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As advocates of psychological essentialism portray a commitment to essentialism 
as a deeply entrenched, universal and innate characteristic of children it is natural to 
regard them as making a substantial claim about human nature: specifically, that it is 
part of our distinctive human nature to hold an essentialist outlook on the world (at 
least when we are children).  
At this point a comment about the relationship between psychological 
essentialism and the kind of essentialism discussed by contemporary metaphysicians  
is in order. Contemporary essentialism about categories is often characterised as a 
view about natural kinds, where natural kinds are conceived as objective categories 
the existence and membership of which is independent of human interest and 
judgment.9 This immediately implies that essentialism is not a doctrine that applies to 
types of artefacts. Moreover, it is often said that Darwin’s theory of evolution by 
natural selection implies that essentialism doesn’t apply to biological categories. For 
example, dogs don’t have an essence as any property that dogs currently have need 
not be present in their descendents.  
All this might appear to suggest that psychological essentialism, with its frequent 
references to the biological and the artefactual, is a misnamed doctrine. However, 
such a view would be a mistake for two reasons. First, what contemporary 
philosophers who take essentialism seriously are saying is that essentialism isn’t 
plausible with respect  to biological and artefactual categories. But it doesn’t follow 
from this that to think of the biological or the artefactual in essentialist terms is 
incoherent. Thus it becomes an empirical question as to whether children (or anyone 
9 A. Bird, ‘Essences and Natural Kinds’. In R. Le Poidevin, P. Simons, A. McGonigal and R.P. 
Cameron (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009). 
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else who is philosophically or scientifically unsophisticated) are essentialist about 
dogs, coffee pots, and the like. Second, the notion of essentialism that the 
contemporary metaphysician operates with seems to be unduly restrictive in only 
allowing properties such as intrinsic physical properties and their kin to belong to 
essences. But why can’t having a particular history or bearing a specific relationship 
to the human mind be part of a category’s essence given that histories and mental 
states are as much a part of the natural world as intrinsic physical properties? 
Considerable empirical evidence has been presented in favour of psychological 
essentialism.10 To get a flavour of this consider Frank Keil’s11 classic experiment. 
Keil showed children and adults a picture of a racoon. When asked these subjects  
answered that the picture was of a racoon. They were then told that the pictured 
animal underwent a series of changes including changes  to  its appearance (through 
fur-dying and plastic surgery), the insertion of a smell sac, and modifications to its 
behaviour. They were then presented with a picture of an animal resembling a skunk 
and told that it was of the original animal post-modification. When asked about the 
identity of the animal at this stage children over the age of seven and adults 
systematically answered that it was a racoon despite its appearance indicating that for 
them something’s being a racoon is a matter of its origins and/or hidden nature rather 
than its observable properties.  
In this paper my concern is to not to evaluate the evidence for psychological 
essentialism but, rather, to determine the  philosophical significance of the doctrine. 
10 See S. Gelman,  ‘Psychological Essentialism in Children’, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8 (2004) 
404-409, and S. Carey, The Origin of Concepts. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) ch 13, for 
helpful overviews.  
11 F. Keil, Concepts, Kinds, and Cognitive Development,  op. cit.. 
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The particular philosophical issue that I will focus on is that concerning the 
relationship between the contents of an individual’s mind and the world external to 
her skull.12 
 
3. Externalism 
 
According to externalism the relationship between the contents of an individual’s  
mind and the world beyond her outer surfaces goes beyond the mere causal. Rather, 
the very identity of the concepts and thoughts she has will depend on the nature of the 
external world that she is embedded in. Consequently, it is in principle possible for 
two individuals to  be molecule for molecule replicas (or identical in terms of their 
intrinsic physical properties) yet have divergent concepts and thoughts due to the fact 
that they inhabit quite different environments. Externalism, contrasts with internalism. 
Internalists reject the view that there exists this non-casual relationship between the 
mind and the external world. For them, the contents of an individual’s concepts and 
thoughts supervene upon their intrinsic physical properties so that molecule for 
12 A number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have utilized a commitment of psychological 
essentialism in addressing philosophical issues. For example, S. Laurence and E. Margolis, (‘Radical 
Concept Nativism’ Cognition 86 (2002), 25-55) and S. Carey, (The Origin of Concepts, op. cit.) 
employ psychological essentialism in seeking to undermine Jerry Fodor’s argument for radical concept 
nativism. (J. Fodor, The Language of Thought. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1975); J. 
Fodor, ‘The Present State of the Innateness Debate’ in his Representations (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1981); and J. Fodor, Concepts, op. cit.). And J. Prinz, (Furnishing the Mind (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2002)) appeals to psychological essentialism in motivating his proxytype theory of 
concepts.  
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molecule duplicates would share their concepts and thoughts no matter how much the 
environments in which they resided diverged.13  
Over the last thirty years externalism has become near orthodoxy in the 
philosophy of mind.14 This is in no small part due to the influence of Hilary Putnam’s  
paper ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”. At the heart of Putnam’s argument is a thought 
experiment that is usually described along the following lines. In a distant part of our 
galaxy there is a planet called Twin Earth that is very much like our own planet. On 
Twin Earth there is a community of individuals who speak a language very much like 
English, a community that has a member – call him Oscar2 – who is a physical 
duplicate of Oscar, a fellow who lives here on Earth. Members of both these linguistic 
communities apply the word ‘water’ to the local colourless, odourless liquid that falls 
as rain, fills their rivers and streams, quenches their thirst, and so on, and intend to 
apply that word only to stuff that is the same liquid as the local ‘water’. One 
significant difference between Earth and Twin Earth is that the stuff they call ‘water’ 
on Twin Earth – the colourless, odourless liquid that fills their rivers and lakes, falls 
13 This way of characterizing the debate between externalists and internalists might seem to be 
problematic as it assumes a materialist or physicalist view of the mind when Descartes, that 
paradigmatic advocate of internalism, was a dualist. My reply is that this characterization will work for 
present purposes as most contemporary externalists reject dualism. See K. Farkas, The Subject’s Point 
of View, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) and T. Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) for an attempt to characterise the debate in a manner that 
doesn’t presuppose materialism or physicalism.  
14 However there are critics. For example: T. Crane, ‘All The Difference in the World’, Philosophical 
Quarterly 41 (1991), 1-25;  N. Chomsky, New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); G. Segal , A Slim Book About Narrow Content, 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000);  A.S. Wikforss ‘Social Externalism and Coneptual Errors’, 
Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2001) 217-3; and K. Farkas, The Subject’s Point of View, op. cit.. 
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as rain, quenches their thirst, and so on – has a physical microstructure that differs 
from that of the stuff that we call ‘water’. For, it is XYZ rather than H2O. In virtue of 
this difference the English word ‘water’ has a different extension than that of the 
Twin English word ‘water’; H2O, and only H2O, falls within the extension of the 
former whereas XYZ, and only XYZ, falls within the extension of the latter. 
Similarly, English sentences containing the word ‘water’ have different truth 
conditions than their Twin English counterparts. For example, the English sentence 
‘water is wet’ is true if and only if H2O is wet whereas the corresponding Twin 
English sentence is true if and only if XYZ is wet. Due to this difference of extension 
and truth conditions, the word ‘water’ has one meaning on Earth and quite another on 
Twin Earth. And an upshot of this it that the twins, being fully fledged members of 
their respective linguistic communities, mean different things by the word ‘water’ (or 
understand that word differently) despite their physical similarity. This leads Putnam 
to conclude that the meaning of a natural kind word on an individual’s lips is partly 
determined by the nature of the external world that she inhabits. 
Putnam was primarily concerned with linguistic meaning and with undermining 
description theories of meaning according to which the reference of a term is 
determined by its sense or intension (where sense or intension is conceived as a 
matter of a description associated with the term by the individual).15 However his  
argument can easily  be extended to generate a parallel conclusion about concepts and 
thoughts. Here is how such an extension might run. We use language to express our 
concepts and thoughts. For example, Oscar uses the word ‘water’ to express one of 
his concepts and the sentence ‘water is wet’ to express a belief of his  that contains 
15 For a helpful overview see D. Braun, ‘Names and Natural Kind Terms’. In E. LePore and B.C. Smith 
(eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).  
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that concept as a constituent. Reflecting the linguistic case, due to the nature of his 
home environment this concept applies to, and only to, H2O and the belief containing 
it is true if and only if H2O is wet. Similarly, the concept that Oscar2 expresses with 
the word ‘water’ applies to and only to XYZ and the belief that contains it is true if 
and only if XYZ is wet. Due to this difference in extension and truth conditions, 
Oscar’s WATER concept and thoughts differ in content from those of his twin. And 
as concepts and thoughts are classified partly in terms of their content, the twins 
diverge in their concepts and thoughts.  
This is a tale that has been told many times but there are important features of 
Putnam’s reasoning that, following many recent commentators,16 I have downplayed. 
As will become clear, it is important to rectify this situation as I will now do. Putnam 
assumes that the word ‘water’ (along with ‘gold’, ‘tiger’ and ‘lemon’) is a natural 
kind term. What makes it a natural kind term is not merely the fact that most of the 
samples of  liquid that members of the English speaking  community characterize as 
‘water’ belong to a common natural kind. All those samples also share certain 
superficial properties and there is in principle nothing to stop there being a word with 
a meaning such it that applies to something if and only if that thing has certain 
superficial properties. What is crucial to a word’s being a natural kind term is the state 
of mind of its users; they must have relevant intentions and make relevant 
assumptions. This is brought out at several points in the ‘Meaning of “meaning”’. For 
example, imagining himself ostensively defining ‘water’, Putnam17 writes:  
 
16 For example, M. Rowlands, Externalism (Cheshum: Acumen, 2003) and R. Wilson, Boundaries of 
the Mind: The Individual in the Fragile Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).  
17 ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”’, op. cit, 225. 
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Suppose I point to a glass of water and say ‘this liquid is called water’ . . . My 
‘ostensive definition’ of water has the following empirical presupposition: that 
the body of liquid I am pointing to bears a certain sameness relation  (say, x is the 
same liquid as y, or x is the sameL as y) to most of the stuff I and other speakers 
in my linguistic community have on other occasions called ‘water’. 
 
When discussing the case of ‘gold’ Putnam18 writes: 
 
when Archimedes asserted that something was gold . . . he was not just saying 
that it had the superficial characteristics of gold . . . ; he was saying that it had 
the same general hidden structure (the same ‘essence’, so to speak) as any 
normal piece of local gold.  
 
In fact, Putnam thinks that related intentions and assumptions are in place with 
respect to words that are normally contrasted with natural kind terms, for example, 
those, such as ‘pencil’, that name types of artefacts: 
 
When we use the word ‘pencil’ we intend to refer to whatever has the same 
nature as the normal examples of the local pencils in the actual world.19  
 
Returning to the case of ‘water’ one might ask what it is for  two samples of a 
liquid to bear the sameL relation to one another. Putnam’s answer is that it is for them 
18 Ibid., 235. 
19 Ibid., 243. 
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to have ‘the same important physical properties’20 that is, the same physical 
microstructure. Consequently, given that the samples of liquid that we routinely call 
‘water’ in our world are invariably collections of H2O molecules the word ‘water’ in 
the English speaking linguistic community has a meaning such that H2O, and only 
H2O, falls in its extension. It is important to note that this doesn’t require anyone to 
know that the crucial property of the liquid they interact with is being H2O. Although 
this fact is common knowledge nowadays it wasn’t known by anyone prior to the 
chemical revolution of the 18th century. 
In sum then, for Putnam, mental states of members of the linguistic community – 
in the form of intentions and assumptions – play a key role in making it the case that 
the nature of the external world enters into the meaning of words such as ‘water’. 
A second important feature of Putnam’s account is his claim that meaning has a 
social dimension in that what a word means on the lips of an individual is inherited 
from what it means on the lips of other members of her linguistic community. This is 
reflected in Putnam’s invocation of the division of linguistic labour. An individual 
might not be able to distinguish between beeches and elms but this does not imply 
that  the words ‘beech’ and ‘elm’ (along with her underlying concepts) mean the same 
thing on her lips. For, she is willing to defer to experts with respect to whether a given 
tree is an elm or a beech. What connects this with Putnam’s point about the role of 
mental states in determining meaning is that he holds that the social dimension of 
meaning depends upon individual speakers having  appropriate intentions and 
thoughts in general. For, meaning wouldn’t have a social dimension if individual 
speakers didn’t intent to mean by a given word what their fellows mean by that word 
20 Ibid, 232. 
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or if they didn’t recognize the existence of experts and intend to defer to their 
judgement with respect to the application of words. 
 
 
4. Externalism and cognitive science 
Arguments echoing that of Putnam have been developed by Kripke and Burge.21 
What is perhaps a little surprising is how much they have influenced naturalistically 
orientated philosophers of mind,  that is philosophers of mind who see their enterprise 
as being closely linked to the empirical study of the mind. For, these standard 
externalist arguments rely upon intuitions and bizarre thought experiments and make 
little reference to empirical work in psychology and cognitive science. Moreover, 
much mainstream work on concepts in cognitive science over the last few decades 
threatens to deliver a different result by implying that Putnam’s twins express the 
same concept by means of ‘water’.  
The most prominent theory of concepts within cognitive science developed over 
the last thirty years is the prototype theory.22 This began life as a reaction to the so-
called classical theory of concepts according to which possessing a concept involves 
knowing or representing necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under the 
concept. A prototype is a complex mental representation that, rather than specifying 
21 S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, op. cit..  T Burge, ‘Individualism and the Mental’, In P.A. French, 
T.E. Ueling Jr. And H.K. Wettstein (eds), Midwest Studies in Philosophy IV, (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press,1979, 73-121). 
22 E. Rosch, ‘Principles of Categorization.’ In E. Rosch and B. B. Lloyd (eds.) Cognition and 
Categorization (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1978). L. J. Rips, E.J. Shoben and E.E. Smith, ‘Semantic 
Distance and the Verification of Semantic Relations’, Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 
12 (1973),  1-20. J.A. Hampton, ‘Polymorphous Concepts in Semantic Memory, Journal of Verbal 
Learning and Verbal Behavior 18 (1979), 441-461. 
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necessary and sufficient conditions, specifies the characteristics that any item falling 
within its extension  is likely to have. For example, on this view the concept DOG is a 
complex representation that specifies properties that dogs generally have, properties 
that something is likely to have if it is a dog. Examples of such properties might be 
those of having four legs, having fur, having a tendency to bark, and so on. Thus, the 
DOG prototype constitutes a description of a prototypical or stereotypical dog and 
grasping the concept DOG is a matter of having this description encoded in one’s 
head. A prototype also includes a similarity metric so that, for example, determining 
whether an item x falls within the extension of DOG involves employing a similarity 
metric in order to determine whether x resembles the prototypical dog to a sufficient 
extent. A Labrador or a Golden Retriever would be a serious candidate for a 
prototypical dog but, presumably, a Great Dane or a Pekinese would not be. That an 
individual would categorise a Pekinese, but not a Siamese cat, as a DOG reflects the 
fact that employment of the similarity metric generates the result that the former, but 
not the latter, is sufficiently similar to the prototypical dog to fall within the extension 
of the concept DOG. 
Generally speaking, advocates of the prototype theory regard prototypes as being 
learned on the basis of experience and as referring to properties that are readily 
perceivable rather than abstract.23 A closely related view is the examplar theory of 
concepts.24   According to this, at the heart of an individual’s  concept C is a 
representation of a particular instance (or number of instances) of C encountered by 
23 This point is emphasized by both J. Prinz, Furnishing the Mind, op. cit.   and S. Gelman, The 
Essential Child, op. cit..  
24 D.L. Medin and M.M. Shaffer, ‘Context Theory of Classification Learning’, Psychological Review 
85 (1978), 207-238. 
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the individual. Accordingly, deciding whether something falls under the concept in 
question involves comparing it with the exemplars. For example, central to my 
concept DOG might be a representation of the dog I had as a child so when I seek to 
determine whether something that I have encountered is a DOG I do so by working 
out whether it is sufficiently similar to the dog I had as a child.  
With respect to externalism, a key point about prototype and exemplar theories of 
concepts is that they don’t sit too happily with that doctrine. For, it would appear that 
the prototypes or exemplars in the head of Oscar and Oscar2 will be indistinguishable 
implying that the twins express the same concepts by means of the word ‘water’ (for, 
recall, prototypes and exemplars tend to represent observable properties). Thus, if one 
wants one’s view of concepts and thoughts to be empirically motivated then it seems 
that one shouldn’t be too impressed by externalist thought experiments.  
One obvious reply to this is to say that psychologists who work on concepts are 
primarily interested in the mechanisms by means of which we categorise things and 
the internal processes by means of which we manipulate the representations 
associated with our concepts. On this front there is no difference between Oscar and 
Oscar2. Nevertheless, if concepts are involved in delivering us knowledge about the 
external world then the identity of the external items that they refer to will be of 
crucial importance and with respect to this Putnam did establish something important. 
For, he established that no matter how similar Oscar and Oscar2’s prototypes are, as 
they were constructed in response to samples of different types of stuff they support 
the possession of concepts that diverge in their reference or extension.25  
25 Something like this line of thought is presented by Susan Carey, The Origin of Concepts, op. cit.  
who, following Ned Block (‘Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology’. In P.A. French (ed.) 
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I’m not convinced that prototype and exemplar theories of concepts can be 
squared with externalism quite so easily. The danger is that the externalist is begging 
the question when she asserts that Oscar and Oscar2’s prototypes where constructed 
in response to different types of stuff. Of course, Oscar interacted with H2O and 
Oscar2 with XYZ. But H2O and XYZ agree with respect to the properties that figure 
in the prototypes in their respective heads so one might equally say that those 
prototypes were constructed in response to the same type of stuff as belonging to the 
relevant type is a matter of observable rather than hidden properties. In other words, 
the externalist has no right to regard the twins’ concepts as being natural kind 
concepts. After all, if the prototype theory is correct then determining whether 
something falls under a given concept will typically done on the basis of a 
consideration of its observable properties. 
It might be objected that the above point ignores that very aspect of Putnam’s line 
of thought that I have sought to emphasise. This is the idea that when ostensively 
defining  ‘water’ an individual points at a sample of water and resolves to apply the 
term ‘water’ only to stuff bearing the sameL to the ostended sample. My response to 
this objection is that from the point of view of someone who advocates the prototype 
theory of concepts this represents a mistaken view of how concepts are acquired. 
Either, a child acquiring concepts doesn’t think of what she interacts with in the 
manner of the individual in Putnam’s scenario or if she does her doing so doesn’t 
enter into the nature and identity of those concepts.  
 
Midwest Studies in Philosophy  (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1986)) endorses a 
two-factor theory of concepts.  
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5. Psychological Essentialism Again  
It is at this point that psychological essentialism becomes relevant for it offers an 
empirically motivated theory that challenges key aspects of prototype and exemplar 
theories of concepts and would appear to sit more happily with externalism. Indeed, 
as both Gelman26 and Carey27 point out, psychological essentialism was partly 
motivated by Putnam  and Kripke’s  reflections.  
Psychological essentialism implies that with respect to many of their concepts 
children think that the items that those concepts group together share a hidden essence 
in virtue of which they fall under the concept in question. Thus, for example, falling 
under the concept DOG is a matter of having the relevant hidden properties rather 
than having any superficial properties that dogs typically have. Hence, form the 
child’s perspective, something can appear to be a dog without being a dog and 
something can be a dog without appearing to be being a dog. This is inconsistent with 
the prototype theory as that theory implies that the concept DOG is such that being a 
dog is wholly a matter of satisfying a prototype made up of features that are both 
readily observable and statistically salient in the child’s environment.  
According to psychological essentialism the relevant hidden properties are often 
not known by the child who thinks of them as being a matter of how things in the 
external world really are in and of themselves. This perspective of the child clearly 
sits happily with that of Putnam as it implies that a child’s concepts work just as he 
supposes concepts like WATER and ELM work. Moreover, it suggests that it is likely 
that children will defer to experts. For, if a child recognises that she doesn’t know 
what the essence of being a dog is then she will be disposed to defer to someone who 
26 S. Gelman, The Essential Child, op. cit..  
27 S. Carey, The Origin of Concepts, op. cit.. 
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she takes not to be hampered by such a lack of knowledge. Note also that the 
psychological essentialist’s emphasis on the perspective of the child echoes Putnam’s 
emphasis on the psychological state of the individual ostensively defining ‘water’.28  
 
6. Psychological Essentialism and Externalism 
In the remainder of this paper I will argue that the relationship between psychological 
essentialism and externalism isn’t as clear-cut as I have thus far implied. Rather, 
psychological essentialism serves to undermine the kind of externalism that is 
commonplace in contemporary philosophy of mind. This is not to say that 
psychological essentialism implies that externalism is false; rather, that the way in 
which the external world determines the contents of our concepts and thoughts is 
severely constrained and directed by our underlying mental states. Consequently, an 
individual’s mental states play a more substantial role in determining the content of 
her concepts and thoughts than is recognized by orthodox externalists. In arguing for 
this conclusion I will tend to focus on natural language words but my reasoning 
applies just as much to the concepts expressed by such words. I will do this for ease 
of exposition and to maintain consistency with Putnam’s description of his 
externalism. 
To explore the issue I will begin by considering a problem that Devitt and 
Sterelny29 raise for a purely causal theory of reference. Recall that one of Putnam’s 
28 None of this is to say that the psychological essentialist is compelled to deny the existence of 
prototypes. For, she can accept that such structures exist and are routinely employed in making 
categorization decisions on the hoof so long as she resists identifying them with the concepts that they 
so help deploy. 
 
29 M. Devitt and K. Sterelny, Language and Reality, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987). 
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targets was the description theory of reference and (along with Kripke) he is often 
characterized as wishing to replace such a position with a causal theory. Now, 
consider an individual pointing at a sample of water and saying ‘I’ll call that type of 
stuff “water”’ (or, alternatively, pointing at a dog and saying ‘I’ll call that kind of 
thing “dog”’). The problem is that the sample or token in question doesn’t just belong 
to the type water (or dog) but to many others. For example, thirst quenching liquid,  
my favorite drink, stuff that expands when frozen (or pet, mammal, vertebrate). This 
raises the qua-problem: when the individual points at the sample of water what is it 
that determines that she succeeds in referring to the sample qua-water as opposed to 
qua-thirst quenching liquid or qua-my favourite drink, or qua-stuff that expands when 
frozen. Similarly, what determines that she points at the dog qua-dog rather than qua 
mammal, qua-pet or qua-vertebrate? Without a convincing answer to this question it 
would seem that the advocate of causal theory of reference is saddled with the 
unfortunate conclusion that term like ‘water’ and ‘dog’ have indeterminate references. 
Devitt and Sterelny suggest that the correct response to the qua-problem is to retreat 
from a purely causal theory of reference and adopt a causal-descriptive theory instead. 
Accordingly, although ‘water’ and ‘dog’ got their reference partly as a result of 
interactions with  samples of water and dogs this fact alone wasn’t enough to secure 
their reference. In addition, the individual ostensively defining these words had an 
appropriate description in mind: she thought of what she was attempting to name as 
being a natural kind whose tokens tend to have particular observable properties.  
One comment on this line of thought is that it seems to cohere well with Putnam’s 
own. That is, he is not arguing for a pure-causal theory as he portrays the individual 
ostensively defining ‘water’ as intending to use that word to refer only to samples of 
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stuff that bear the ‘sameL relationship’ to the sample she points at. Moreover, he 
represents the individual as having a ‘stereotype’ in mind that she associates with the 
word in question. So his point is not so much to establish a pure casual theory of 
reference but to undermine the idea that an individual’s internal mental states are the 
sole determinants of the reference and meaning of the words on her lips.  
Nevertheless, the qua-problem does gesture towards something that I think is very 
important with respect to the viability of externalism and its relationship to 
psychological essentialism. Focusing on the example ‘water’ what is it to bear the 
sameL relationship to the ostened sample of colourless, odourless, thirst quenching 
liquid? As we have seen, Putnam thinks that it has to do with having the same 
microstructure and in the case in question that would involve being composed of H2O 
molecules. That being composed of H2O molecules is what is needed to bear the 
sameL relationship to the ostended sample is not knowable a priori according to 
Putnam, a line of thought which sits happily with place-holder conceptions of 
psychological essentialism.  Rather, it is a matter for science to discover. But this 
raises a further question: does the individual need to think that to bear the sameL 
relationship to the sample of liquid before her a sample of liquid has to have the same 
microstructure? Putnam is committed to a negative answer to this question. This is 
because he thinks that the meaning of words like ‘water’ and ‘gold’ have  remained 
constant over centuries so that they meant just what they mean now at a point in time 
when no-one had the scientific sophistication to think of the sameL relation in 
microphysical terms. What I want to suggest is that however this question is answered 
there are serious repercussions for externalism in the light of psychological 
essentialism. Thus, the question poses a dilemma for the externalist neither horn of 
which she should find attractive. 
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Suppose that, following Putnam,  we answer the question negatively in saying that 
the individual need not think of the sameL relation in terms of microstructure. Let’s 
accept that what makes water water is a matter of microstructure. In other words, that 
water is essentially H2O. However, a parallel point could not be made of all types of 
liquid for which we have concepts. Consider, for example, milk. Any sample of milk 
will have a particular microstructure  and a physical makeup in general. It will largely 
consist of molecules of H2O along with various vitimins, minerals and fat molecules. 
Such physical properties will provide the causal basis for the observable properties of 
the sample, such as its colour, its taste and smell, how it responds to being heated 
along with its powers to nourish. But having such physical properties is not what 
makes the sample milk. In other words, milk doesn’t have the same sort of essence as 
water, that is a microphysical or physico-chemical essence. To see this consider the 
following thought experiment. On an arid planet a team of super-intelligent robots 
who have never previously encountered water, synthesise a collection of H2O 
molecules that they store in a beaker in their laboratory. These molecules form a 
colourless liquid that any visiting human would be unable to distinguish from water. 
Would this stuff be water? I contend that it would even though it has different origins 
from the water here on Earth and even though it doesn’t play anything like the same 
role in the life of its home planet that water does here. For example, it doesn’t fall as 
rain, fill any lakes or rivers or help sustain the life of any living creature. This is a 
simple consequence of water’s having a microsphysical essence.  
Now suppose that the robots take the water they have manufactured and mix it 
with a range of vitamins, minerals and fats that they have also synthesized so as to 
make something that is identical at the physico-chemical level to the glass of milk that 
I have just poured from a plastic bottle in my fridge. They don’t drink this liquid and 
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if they did it would certainly not provide them with any nourishment. Neither did they 
make it with the intention to provide nourishment for any other things. In fact, they 
are not in contact with any living things that would be nourished by the liquid. 
Qeustion: is the liquid they have made milk? My answer is that it is not as what 
makes milk milk is not its physico-chemical properties per se. Rather, the essence of 
milk has to do with its origins and function; that it is manufactured in the body of a 
living creature with the function of sustaining and nourishing its young offspring. In 
short, the milk-like liquid the robots manufacture doesn’t have the relevant origins 
and function to be milk.  
Now consider Twin Earth where the liquid that they call milk – a liquid that  is 
produced in the  bodies of the creatures they call ‘mammals’ and is made and used to 
provide nourishment for the young offspring of those creatures – is largely made up 
of XYZ. Question: is this liquid milk? I would deliver an affirmative answer on the 
basis that it has a relevant origin and function.  
In sum then, a sample of liquid can fail to  be milk whilst being identical at the 
physico-chemical level to the milk in my glass and something can be milk whilst 
being very different at the physico-chemical level to that milk. What this implies is 
not that milk doesn’t have an essence but that its essence isn’t microsphysical or 
chemico-physical; rather it is functional or bio-functional. Neither does it imply that 
‘milk’ isn’t a kind term or MILK a kind concept, just that the relevant kind is 
functional or bio-functional rather than physical. Some philosophers might baulk at 
this suggestion that ‘milk’/MILK is a kind term/concept on the grounds that it groups 
together items whose behvaour is governed by different physical and chemical laws 
and distinguishes between items whose behaviour is governed by the same physical 
and chemical laws. I would respond that they are operating with an unduly restrictive 
 21 
notion of ‘kind’ but I don’t have to insist on this point for the purposes of my 
argument. As will become clear, all I need is for my claim about what makes milk 
milk to be true.  
Both the terms and concepts ‘water’/WATER and ‘milk’/MILK are prominent in 
our linguistic and mental lives and it is important that a child acquires them early in 
her development, something that a typical child can be expected to do. Now imagine 
an individual pointing at a sample of milk whilst saying ‘milk’ alongside the intention 
to use that word in future only to refer to stuff that bears the sameL relation to the 
stuff before her. What meaning will she have bestowed upon ‘milk’? What concept 
will she have acquired? Will it be milk/MILK or some orthogonal physico-chemical 
concept? Echoing the kind of scenario highlighted by Devitt and Sterelny30  the 
sample of liquid before her falls both under the concept MILK and under some 
distinct chemico-physical concept. Earlier I posed a dilemma and we are now 
investigating the first horn of that dilemma. This involves following Putnam in 
committing oneself to the view that the individual doesn’t think of the sameL relation 
as being a matter of sharing a common-microstructure with the ostended sample. 
Rather, she has a neutral or unarticulated idea of the relation. But this gives rise to an 
indeterminacy problem: why would the naming ceremony privilege the attribution of 
the meaning milk to ‘milk’ (and the acquisition of the concept MILK) rather than an 
alternative meaning relating to physico-chemical properties? Here, unlike the kind of 
cases that Devitt and Sterelny discuss, appeal to a stereotype or in-head description 
relating to observable properties won’t help to disambiguate the pointing act. Let me 
explain why. When the individual points  at a dog she is also pointing at a mammal. 
So what meaning is attributed to  the word ‘dog’ at the naming ceremony? Is it dog or 
30 M. Devitt and K. Sterelny, Language and Reality,  op. cit.. 
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is it mammal? It seems that the stereotype or description in the head of the individual 
settles this question at least to the extent that it rules out mammal. For the description 
will  refer to properties that dogs tend to have but that mammals in general don’t have 
so that the description or stereotype will ‘fit’ dogs in general in a manner in which it 
won’t fit mammals in general. Another way of putting this is to say that the 
description would serve in the identification of detection of dogs but not of mammals 
in general. As we have seen, to say this fits well with Putnam’s picture. But in the 
case of the sample of milk such a move won’t help. Any stereotype or in-head 
description will fit the physico-chemical kind just as much as it fits milk as anything 
that is like the ostended sample at that level will share the kind of observable 
properties that will figure in the stereotype or in-head description.  
The upshot of this is that if the individual operates with an unarticulated notion of 
the nature of the sameL relation then she is not going to be successful in attributing a 
determinate meaning or reference to ‘milk’ or in acquiring a determinate concept 
when she attempts to bestow meaning on that word.  
But the same holds with respect to ‘water’. The sample of water ostended in the 
will fall under a concept that binds together samples of liquid that have a common 
origin, ‘lifestyle’ and role in human life and life in general. One might describe this as 
the concept of a liquid that fills rivers and streams, falls as rain, comes out of taps, 
and is fundamental to the survival of most living things. Earlier  I argued that MILK 
is a bio-functional concept. With respect to the concept I am now describing, it might 
be described as a functional concept. Call this concept FWATER. In the environment 
of the individual ostensively defining ‘water’ everything that falls under FWATER 
also falls under the concept WATER and vice versa. However, the concepts are not 
co-extensive as the XYZ on Twin Earth falls under FWATER though it is not water. 
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And the H2O synthesized by the super-intelligent robots described above falls under 
WATER but not FWATER.  
So the question is this: why does ‘water’ get attributed the meaning water rather 
than fwater? I don’t see how any plausible answer can be given to this question if one 
holds onto the idea that the individual in the naming ceremony operates with an 
unarticulated notion of the same-L relation.  
So far I have focused on the use of ostensive definition to bestow meaning on a 
word. But ostension can also be used  to teach  the meaning of word that already has 
its meaning fixed to another individual. Consider an individual who means water by 
‘water’ attempting to teach the meaning of ‘water’ to someone else by means of an 
ostensive definition. If what I have said so far is true then for this attempt at teaching 
to be successful the would-be learner must have an appropriately articulated 
understanding of the sameL  relation in her mind. Without this there will be no fact of 
the matter as to whether she comes to attribute ‘water’ the meaning water or fwater. 
Is the second horn of the dilemma any more promising? Taking this horn involves 
attributing the individual ostensively defining a word such as ‘water’ (or attempting to 
learn the meaning of such word on the basis of an ostensive definition) a more fully 
articulated notion of the sameL relation, where she thinks that  bearing that relation to 
the ostended liquid involves having the same microstructure. There are a couple of 
worries with this suggestion. The first relates to the plausibility of the idea that when 
the word ‘water’ first entered the language it did so as the result of a naming 
ceremony involving an individual who  thought of the liquid she was pointing at as 
having a microphysical essence. As such an event would have had to have taken place 
considerably before the scientific revolution of the eighteenth century one might 
reasonably doubt that anyone operated with such a thought.  
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The second worry is this. Perhaps the individual will succeed in bestowing the 
meaning water on ‘water’ and on acquiring the concept WATER but she runs the risk 
of bestowing  a meaning other than milk on ‘milk’ and so not acquiring the concept 
MILK. Given that milk and water have quite different essences the individual will 
need to desist in thinking of the sameL relation as being a matter of microstructure in 
the case of ‘milk’. Instead, she would need to operate with an alternative (yet still 
articulated) idea of what the sameL relation amounted to in the case of milk, one that 
characterised that relation in terms of bio-functional role. One might wonder why the 
individual would be motivated to regard the sample of milk so differently from the 
sample of liquid in operating with different notions of the sameL relation with regard 
to them. After all it is not as if the milk doesn’t have a microstructure or that the water 
doesn’t have distinctive origins and a particular important role in our lives. 
Nevertheless, the second horn of the dilemma  does seem to be preferable to the first 
for it does explain how ‘water’ and ‘milk’ could have come to mean what they mean 
and how an individual could learn the meanings of these words on the basis of being 
given an ostensive definition .  
What are the implications of this for the viability of externalism? The mere fact 
that the individual ostensively defining ‘water’ is interacting with a sample of water 
does not ensure that she will bestow the meaning water on the word ‘water’ or 
succeed in teaching that meaning to anyone else. She could just as well bestow or 
teach  the meaning fwater (along with her doppelganger on Twin Earth). For the 
microstructure of the ostended sample of water to have a semantic significance it must 
be thought of in a relevant way by both the definer and the learner. They must think 
of the ostended sample as having a physical microstructure and intend to apply the 
word ‘water’ only to samples of liquid that have that very microstructure. In other 
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words, they must have an articulated notion of what the sameL relation amounts to in 
this case. But they must also have at their disposal alternative notions of the sameL 
relation that they utilize when dealing with words such as ‘milk’.  
None of this implies that externalism is false for one can construct a twin scenario 
where an individual on Earth attempts to bestow meaning on the word ‘water’ 
operating with the relevant articulated notion of the nature of the sameL relation. Here 
the word water will acquire the meaning water and she will acquire the concept 
WATER. Her twin on Twin Earth, operating with just the same notion of the sameL 
relation, will bestow a different meaning on ‘water’ and acquire a different concept. 
However, the resultant externalism will be somewhat chastened as the implication of 
my reasoning is the that extent to which the external world shapes the meaning of 
one’s words and the content of one’s concepts is very much constrained and directed 
by one’s internal mental states. For inhabitants of Earth and Twin Earth respectively 
to mean different things by ‘water’ (or express different concepts by means of that 
word) they must have quite specific mental states lying behind their interactions with 
the external world, mental states that the external world itself doesn’t guarantee that 
they have. This serves to undermine the kind of externalism that dominates 
contemporary philosophy of mind and language according to which the mere fact that 
the samples of liquid that we interact with and label ‘water’ implies that that word 
refers to, and only to, H2O and that H2O, and only H2O, fall under the concept 
expressed by that word. It also serves to undermine Putnam’s position even though he 
emphases the importance of mental states in contributing to the determination of 
meaning. 
So far I have focused on the case of language but my reasoning applies just as 
much to concepts. Thus, for an individual to acquire the concept WATER from her 
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interactions with water (be those interactions direct or mediated by her experiences of 
her fellows’ use of the word ‘water’) she needs to think of the target concept as 
grouping together items in virtue of their having a common microstructure.  If she 
thinks of the target concept in some alternative but equally articulated way then she 
will acquire not WATER but some other concept (FWATER, perhaps). And if she is 
neutral on the question of what binds together the items that fall under the target 
concept then she runs the risk of failing to acquire a determinate concept.  
I now want to consider a potential objection to my line of argument. This draws 
upon essentialism as a doctrine about particulars as opposed to categories. The idea is 
that although the sample of liquid that figures in the ostensive definition of ‘water’ is 
both water and fwater it is essentially the former and only contingently the later. It is 
this difference that explains why ‘water’ has the meaning water rather than fwater 
bestowed upon it. Thus there is no need to demand of the individual that she has a 
richly articulated notion of the sameL relation.  
I have three points to make in response to this objection. First, it runs the risk of 
making it a mystery as to how ‘milk’ means what it does and how we acquire the 
concept MILK. For, if the essence of a sample of water relates to its microstructure 
then why doesn’t the essence of a sample of milk? One might respond by saying that 
the essential function of milk relates to biology (that it is produced within the bodies 
of biological systems for the use of their offspring) so making milk a biological kind 
and so something in the scientific domain. Whereas, fwater isn’t a biological kind but 
more of an artefactual kind so falling outside of the scientific domain. However, I’m 
not convinced by this as the essential function of fwater partly relates to its usage by 
biological systems whose survival depends upon it and which have evolved to utilize 
it. So why isn’t fwater a biological kind? Moreover, if it is conceded that FWATER is 
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an artefactual concept it might be pointed out that some prominent psychological 
essentialists31 argue that our innate essentialist commitments cover the artefactual so 
that there is an empirical basis for thinking that a particular can have an artefactual 
essence.  
My second point is that such an essentialism about particulars is hardly mandatory. 
Thus the advocate of this objection needs to produce some justification for it. Such a 
justification isn’t going to come from developmental psychology as psychological 
essentialists are quite clear that our innate essentialist commitments relate to 
categories and kinds and not particulars. Thus, there is little empirical support for the 
claim that it is part of our innate metaphysical perspective on the world that 
particulars have essences. And even if it were that wouldn’t be much help given that, 
as indicated in the previous paragraph, psychological essentialists often argue that our 
essentialist commitments spread beyond the domain of physics and biology. This 
implies that if empirical work in developmental psychology is invoked to settle the 
issue there is the real prospect that it will support the claim that from the perspective 
of the typical human the essence of a particular thing that is an artefact relates to its 
being an artefact as much as its falling under any kind recognized by science.  
A third point is that we have to make sense of how all of the words that we use 
mean what they mean, of why all of our concepts have the content that they have. As 
we have plenty of words that refer to artefacts and as the acquisition of many 
artefactual concepts is fundamental to a child’s development the advocate of the 
objection under discussion runs the risk of making a mystery of how we could have 
such words and concepts. 
31 For example, Paul Bloom, Descartes’ Baby, op. cit.. 
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I can envisage another objection to my line of thought that runs as follows. Perhaps 
it is correct to say that a range of articulated notions of essence are needed to ground 
the meanings of the words of our language and the concepts that we use them to 
express. But it doesn’t follow from this that every individual need have and employ 
such a range of articulated notions of essence. For we mustn’t forget that one of 
Putnam’s key points relates to the social dimension of meaning. It is only the 
individual members of the linguistic community who first coin a word – or the experts 
with respect to the application of that word –  who need to have and employ the 
relevant articulated notion of essence (be it microstructuaral, bio-functional, or 
whatever).  
I have two replies to this objection. The first is that it makes it too easy to know the 
meaning of a word or grasp a concept and rules out as impossible perfectly normal 
phenomena such as failing to understand a word and misunderstanding a word. Being 
a competent member of a linguistic community doesn’t imply that one knows the 
meanings of all the words of the community’s language or grasps all the concepts 
expressed by those words. Suppose an individual has encountered the word ‘vitamin’ 
but knows little about what vitamins are. Then they could can hardly be said to grasp 
the concept VITAMIN or mean vitamin by that word. In such a case the  individual 
could be expected to be aware of their ignorance so as not to make any claims about 
understanding the word or concept in question. But there are other cases where an 
individual mistakenly believes that she knows what a particular word means in the 
wider community. A common example relates to the word ‘disinterested’. Many 
people think this word means uninterested  rather than unbiased.  If such a person 
were to describe someone as ‘disinterested’ they would be saying that they were 
uninterested rather that unbiased. This would be so regardless of the meaning of the 
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word in the wider community and even if the individual intended to mean by 
‘disinterested’ just what everyone else meant. In sum then, the familiar phenomena of  
failing to understand the meaning of a word and misunderstanding a word that one 
uses suggest that for an individual’s linguistic knowledge and concepts to line up with  
those of her fellows considerable demands are placed on her underlying mental states. 
None of this is to deny the existence of a division of linguistic labour. Suppose I 
can’t tell elms from beeches. I can till mean different things by the words ‘elm’ and 
‘beech’ and mean what the experts mean by them. But that this is the case requires me 
to meet various conditions. I know that ‘elm’ and ‘beech’ name  distinct species of 
trees and so employ the concepts TREE and  SPECIES in connection with those 
words. I think that the respective species picked out by ‘elm’ and ‘beech’ are different 
in ways broadly similar to those in which oaks and sycamores (which I can tell apart) 
differ. Hence, I think they  differ with respect to leaf shape, size, DNA, evolutionary 
history,  and such like. I also accept that there are experts and would defer to them but 
I have some idea about what makes an expert an expert, how to find one, and the 
kinds of techniques they would use. So it would seem that the divide between me and 
the experts isn’t so extreme and that to avail myself of the division of linguistic labour 
I have to have quite a rich body of specific mental states.  
My second reply is that the objection doesn’t sit very well with practice in 
developmental psychology where it is taken as a real possibility that individuals 
undergo conceptual development as they mature. Thus, for example, a developmental 
psychologist might argue that the concept that a typical five year old child expresses 
by means of the word ‘cause’ differs from that expressed by a typical ten year old 
when she uses  ‘cause’,  which in turn differs from that expressed by a typical adult 
when she uses ‘cause’. But if the power of the wider linguistic community to enter 
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into the mind of the individual is as great as the objection implies, then such 
conceptual development is an impossibility. But rejecting the coherence of orthodox 
developmental psychology seems to me to be too  high a cost of endorsing the 
objection under consideration.  
 
7. Conclusion 
In this article I have argued that, despite first appearances, psychological essentialism 
undermines the kind of externalist view of the content of our concepts and thoughts 
that has become commonplace in the philosophy of mind and language.  This a 
consequence  of the psychological essentialist’s emphasis on a range of concepts that 
includes those of biological phenomena and artefacts as well as those of  types of 
physical  stuff. If a child is to acquire such a wide range of concepts then she will 
need to have at her disposal a range of articulated notions of essence and bring the 
relevant notion of essence to bear in each particular case. For example, the articulated 
notion of essence that she will need to deploy in acquiring  the concept WATER will 
be different from that that she needs to deploy in acquiring the concept MILK. 
Without the appropriate articulated notions of essence a child will not acquire these 
concepts no matter how much water and milk she interacts with. This is not to say that 
the extra-cranial world plays no role in determining the contents of our thoughts and 
concepts  but the  extent to which it does is severely constrained and directed by our 
internal mental states. 
 
 
  
 
 31 
